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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.

ANTONIO J. GALVAN,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NO. 47017-2019
BANNOCK COUNTY NO. CR-2017-9259

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Galvan pled guilty to one count of aggravated driving under the influence, and the
district court imposed a sentence often years, with five years fixed, but retained jurisdiction. On
appeal, Mr. Galvan asserts the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive
underlying sentence.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In August of 2017, Pocatello police officers responded to a report of an accident
involving two vehicles.

(Presentence Report (PSI), p.4.) 1 After arriving on the scene, the

officers determined that Mr. Galvan's car had crashed into the back of another man's vehicle,
and the other man had been injured. (PSI, p.4.) After field sobriety tests and a drug recognition
evaluation were completed, the officers determined that Mr. Galvan was under the influence of
central nervous system depressants, and he was arrested for aggravated driving under the
influence. (PSI, p.4.) He later admitted he was under the influence of Xanax at the time. (PSI,
p.5.) Subsequently, Mr. Galvan was charged, by Information, with one count of aggravated
driving while under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any other intoxicating substance.
(R., p.52.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Galvan agreed to plead guilty and pay restitution in
exchange for the State agreeing to concur with the PSI sentencing recommendation and
recommend no more than a rider with an underlying sentence of six years, with two years fixed.
(12/17/18 Tr., p.5, Ls.6-19; R., pp.262-68.)
At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Galvan's counsel requested that the district court place
Mr. Galvan on probation. (4/1/19 Tr., p.5, L.16 - p.6, L.20.) The State concurred with the PSI
recommendation, which was for retained jurisdiction (PSI, p.19), and did not recommend a
specific underlying sentence. (4/1/19 Tr., p.8, L.22 - p.11, L.6.) Subsequently, the district court
imposed a sentence of ten years, with five years fixed, and retained jurisdiction.

(4/1/19

Tr., p.32, Ls.10-13; R., p.286.) Mr. Galvan then filed a notice of appeal timely from the district
court's judgment of conviction. (R., pp.291-93.)
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All citations to the PSI refer to the 54-page electronic document.
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ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed an underlying sentence of ten years,
with five years fixed, following Mr. Galvan's plea of guilty to one count of aggravated driving
under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or any other intoxicating substance?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed An Underlying Sentence Of Ten
Years, With Five Years Fixed, Following Mr. Galvan's Plea Of Guilty To One Count Of
Aggravated Driving Under The Influence Of Alcohol, Drugs, Or Any Other Intoxicating
Substance
Given the facts of this case, Mr. Galvan's underlying sentence of ten years, with five
years fixed, is excessive because it is not necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing. When
there is a claim that the sentencing court imposed an excessive sentence, this Court will conduct
"an independent review of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the
character of the offender and the protection of the public interest." State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho
1, 8 (2016). In such a review, the Court "considers the entire length of the sentence under an
abuse of discretion standard." Id. An appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry when an
exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal. It considers whether the trial court: "(1) correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion;
(3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it;
and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason." Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho
856, 863 (2018).
The fourth factor is the most important for sentencing purposes, and the one that is absent
in this case. "When a trial court exercises its discretion in sentencing, 'the most fundamental
requirement is reasonableness."' McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8 (quoting State v. Hooper, 119 Idaho
606, 608 (1991)). Unless it appears that the length of the sentence is "necessary to accomplish
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the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution," the sentence is unreasonable. Id. When a sentence is
excessive "considering any view of the facts," because it is not necessary to achieve these goals,
it is unreasonable and therefore an abuse of discretion. Id.
There are multiple mitigating factors that illustrate why Mr. Galvan's underlying
sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. First, this is Mr. Galvan's only
felony conviction. (PSI, pp.5-8.) Such information has long been recognized to be mitigating.

See e.g., State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982) (reducing sentence where present conviction
"was the defendant's first felony with no prior history of any sexual violations").
Additionally, Mr. Galvan accepted responsibility for this offense and expressed his
remorse over the accident and the victim's injuries. In commenting on the offense, he explained
that he felt "completely horrible" about the "impact it had" on the victim and his family. (PSI,
p.5.) Similarly, at the sentencing hearing, Mr. Galvan said he was "sincerely sorry" for his
actions. (4/1/19 Tr., p.25, Ls.15-17.) He also said that he took accountability for those actions.
(4/1/19 Tr., p.25, Ls.17-19.) Finally, he said, "And I understand that the damage caused and
everything is irreversible, and there's nothing I can say or really to make up for the pain and all
that you have gone through. But I just want you to know that I'm sincerely sorry for what I've
done." (4/1/19 Tr., p.25, Ls.19-24.) Such statements should also be considered as mitigating
information supporting a shorter sentence. State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594-95 (1982)
(reducing the defendant's sentence, in part, because "the defendant has accepted responsibility
for his acts" and "expressed regret for what he had done .... ").
Further, Mr. Galvan not only said he was accepting responsibility, he also agreed to pay
restitution to the victim. (12/17/18 Tr., p5. Ls.18-21; 4/1/19 Tr., p.10, Ls.13-18.) This is yet
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another recognized mitigating factor. State v. Hall, 114 Idaho 887, 889 (Ct. App. 1988) (treating
the defendant's "expressed willingness to provide restitution" as a mitigating factor); see also
I.C. § 19-2521(2) ("The following grounds, while not controlling the discretion of the court, shall
be accorded weight in favor of avoiding a sentence of imprisonment: ... (f) The defendant has
compensated or will compensate the victim of his criminal conduct for the damage or injury that
was sustained; provided, however, nothing in this section shall prevent the appropriate use of
imprisonment and restitution in combination .... ").
Mr. Galvan also struggles with severe mental health problems. He has been diagnosed
with a major depressive disorder, an anxiety disorder, an attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder,
and a bipolar disorder. (PSI, pp.13-14, 35-36.) These problems should also be considered as a
mitigating sentencing factor. State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho 384, 391 (1994) ("Idaho Code § 192523, which requires that the trial court consider the defendant's mental illness as a sentencing
factor, was an integral part of the legislature's repeal of mental condition as a defense.").
Despite his mental health issues, however, Mr. Galvan was gainfully employed at the time of this
offense; he was working at McDonald's as a crew trainer. (PSI, p.12.) This is also a mitigating
factor. State v. Hagedorn, 129 Idaho 155, 161 (Ct. App. 1996) (approvingly referencing the
district court's consideration of the defendant's good employment history in mitigation).
Indeed, given the wealth of mitigating information in this case, Mr. Galvan's underlying
sentence was excessive because it was not necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing, and the
district court failed to adequately consider the mitigating information when it imposed the
sentence.

Given the facts of this case, Mr. Galvan's extended underlying sentence was not

necessary and therefore unreasonable. As such, the district court abused its discretion when it
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imposed Mr. Galvan's underlying sentence because it failed to reach its sentencing decision
through an exercise of reason.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Galvan respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate.
DATED this 19th day of September, 2019.

/ s/ Reed P. Anderson
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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